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Gender is constructed and constrained by a binary dichotomy, which 
crystallizes in childhood, and any subsequent deviance is subject to heavy 
criticism. Discuss. 
Introduction 
Gendered identity is constructed and confined by social discourse, and is expressed 
through homogenizing binary gender norms which prescribe the ‘appropriate’ means 
of gender performance. The definition of the ‘feminine’ role expected of women is 
given by men, who in a patriarchal modern society are the dominant gender. I will 
examine what ‘performativity’ means in terms of gender discourse, and analyse how 
exclusionary this can be for the gender dysphoric and the transsexual. I will look at 
the relevant legislation for allowing them legal acknowledgement of their acquired 
gender, and provide commentary on its ineffectiveness because it perpetuates the 
gender binary dichotomy. Pursuant to this, I will deconstruct how girls become 
‘feminine’; a learning process which crystallizes in childhood rather than any innately 
biological attributes they may have. I will consider how society responds to deviance 
from these gender-appropriate norms with condemnation and pathology; none more 
demonstrably so than in the case of women who kill. 
 
 
Gender as a result of discourse 
Gender is a concept primarily constructed by culture and history. It is a qualitative 
meaning socio-legal meanings we attach to certain attributes and characteristics of 
bodies. This process of attaching meaning to bodies is the acceptance of gender-




specific norms and behaviours; subscription to which indicates conformity with the 
hegemonizing form of social control that gender offers. 
Within Western society, sex and gender can be distinguished between as two 
separate concepts. Sex is the process of recognising “male and female sex from 
physiological attributes, such as genitals and chromosomes”, whereas gender is 
defined as the “social and cultural expectation of how males and females should 
think, behave and how they should be treated by others”1. These are often, 
mistakenly, confused as one and the same.  
The concept of gender is constrained within the limits of social discourse, which itself 
is subject to cultural variation. Foucault, the main proponent of discourse as a 
construction site for gender, argues the body is a text for culture. He believed that 
through the pursuance of an elusive goal, gendered identity is commissioned 
"through the organization and regulation of the time, space, and movements of our 
daily lives, our bodies are trained, shaped, and impressed with the stamp of 
prevailing historical forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity, femininity"2. This 
discourse insists the conformity to a standardized ideal, none more prevalent than 
through the gender binary dichotomy. 
Heteronormative binary gender dichotomy 
It is argued by Butler3 that gender is fluid in nature and that bodies can float along a 
sliding scale between masculinity and femininity; 
 
1 M. Wiseman, S. Davidson, ‘Problems with binary gender discourse: Using context to promote flexibility and 
connection in gender identity’ (2012) Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 17, at 528 
2 S. R. Bordo, 'The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist Appropriation of Foucault', in 'Gender 
/ Body / Knowledge', edited by A. M. Jaggar, S. R. Bordo, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1992), at 
14 
3 J. Butler, ‘Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity’ (Routledge: London, 1990) 




"[w]hen the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent 
of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man 
and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman 
and feminine a male body as easily as a female one”4. 
Gender fluidity emphasises the ability to become ambiguous and numerous genders 
but although an idyllic potentiality, this is not the case in practice. Gender exists, and 
always has existed, as an artificially-restrained format within a heteronormative 
binary, with two mutually-exclusive polar opposites. This binary provides that 
biologically male bodies display appropriately masculine traits, and, conversely, 
biologically female bodies display appropriately feminine traits. The word ‘traits’ here 
has been used to mean performance, mannerisms, etc. These, in turn, produces 
gendered expectations on criteria such as sporting ability, clothing, sexuality etc. 
These pervasive expectations dictate how society perceives and subsequently treats 
any given individual, depending on their performance of their appropriate gender 
norms. 
The gender binary dichotomy is fixed “with prescribed forms of expression – one is 
born as female/male, behaves in a feminine/masculine way at all times throughout 
one’s life”5. To express gender identity in a way which does correspond neatly within 
the binary is considered to be unnatural, and often mislabelled as a form of mental 
disorder; for example gender dysphoria - something which I shall discuss later on. 
The impetus behind ‘bipolar’6 gender binary norms can be attributed to biological 
essentialism, which purports that gender identity can be reduced to scientific 
 
4 Ibid, in Chapter 1, ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire’, at 6 
5 N. 1, at 529 
6 J. T. Spence & R. L. Helmreich, ‘Masculinity & Femininity: Their Psychological Dimensions, Correlates, & 
Antecedents’, (University of Texas Press: Austin & London, 1978), at preface, ix 




definition. This suggests there is some ‘essential’ characteristic every person 
possesses which renders them male and masculine, or female and feminine. It 
would follow from this that men would be assertive and aggressive leaders as the 
historical foragers and protectors, and inherent within women are nurturing and 
maternal instincts as the historical caregivers. Irigaray reduces the female body to 
the over-simplistic “woman as womb”7. Biological essentialism is problematic 
because it posits that gender follow biology back to primal instincts; despite a 
person’s biological sex and gender being completely separate. Irigaray’s essentialist 
conceptualisation of gender is presented with blinkers; it ignores all forms of 
otherness8 and rejects any divergent form of gender undertaking, making the 
practical applications of her theory limited. Of this, Butler asserts that biological 
essentialism can be disputed because although sex is determined by biology, gender 
is culturally-constructed9. Butler’s rejection of essentialism is evident within Gender 
Trouble, where it is discussed that gender is not constrained by the biological 
predispositions of our sex, and so transcends the cultural and social discourse 
constructing it; becoming free-floating.  
However, gender can only be free-floating if it exists in some way between 
masculinity and femininity. As undesirable as it is to be oppressed by a binary scale, 
it is difficult to envisage a way to refer to gender without it. Self-identification to a 
gender is a necessary, and arguably unfortunate, part of modern life. Not all 
gendered possibilities are open; the limits are always set within a homogenic cultural 
discourse predicated on inescapable binary structures. Gender can only be free-
 
7 L. Irigaray, ‘The Sex Which Is Not One’, translated by C. Porter & C. Burke, (Cornell University Press: New York, 
1985), in Chapter 5: Così Fan Tutti, at 94 
8 M. Whitford, ‘Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine’, (Routledge: London, 1991), in preface, at 4 
9 N. 4 




floating if it exists some way between male and female, but this still necessitates the 
existence of such a scale. Gender as a concept only has meaning if in opposition. To 
become free-floating so as to transcend the gender binary, as Butler suggests, would 
essentially be a rejection of the whole concept of gender. It would require the 
disablement of century’s worth of discourse which is not just external to society, but 
ingrained within society’s thinking processes.  
 
Momentarily overlooking how unlikely this is to be adopted by future society, it 
affords no protection to people who willingly identify with a binary gender category. 
For example, females would be unable to petition for equal pay if they do not wish to 
be viewed as ‘females’, for they reject the very binary from which they are deriving 
their politics. As Moi argues, “it still remains politically essential for feminists to 
defend women as women in order to counteract the patriarchal oppression that 
precisely defines women as women”10. It is the concept of identification as ‘woman’ 
as defined by males which critical feminist theory resists11. 
The hegemonizing gender binary dichotomy supports heterosexuality as the norm, 
where masculine males and feminine females are the ‘privileged’ bodies within the 
societal hierarchy. Law has a vested interest in the regulation of sexuality through 
the restraints of lawful marriage; where two consenting heterosexual adults can 
engage in coitus. This elitist and exclusionary tool of legal control happenstances the 
creation and maintenance of what the law believes to be a balanced society. This 
asserts a brand of ‘babydoll’ sexuality where women rely on their submissive 
 
10 T. Moi, ‘Sexual / Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory’, (Methuen: London, 1985), at 13 
11 T. de Lauretis, ‘Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness’, (1990) 16 Feminist Studies 
1, at 126 




femininity to please men sexually12. Gender and sexuality are not inextricably linked, 
and it does not follow that a feminine female or a masculine male be straight. 
However, this misconception by society through public gender discourse reasserts 
masculine dominance over the feminine. 
 
 
How femininity is constructed by and within society 
I will be focusing in particular on how femininity is constructed within society. The 
feminine role, as constructed by existing discourse, proves at best to be hypocritical 
and self-opposing. It has been said that “there is no feminine outside language”13, 
but, within a patriarchal society, it seems that only men are talking. 
‘Femininity’ is the possession of many conflicting attributes - where the performance 
of femininity is subservient and ridiculed, yet simultaneously subject to insidiously 
unattainable goals. What constitutes the truly ‘feminine’ (arguably society’s ideal 
woman) is a term fashioned through a firmly male perspective. The entire framework 
of femininity is underpinned by Draconian discriminations; where women are 
presumed to be childlike, indecisive, obedient, self-depraving, nurturing, maternal, 
over-emotional and chaste. Simultaneously, femininity means pedantry, bossiness, 
provocativeness and the capability of pleasing a man sexually. The two conflicting 
ideologies are incompatible yet society still contemporaneously applies them.  
 
12 E. G. Davis, 'The First Sex', (Compton Printing Ltd: London, 1973), in Chapter 22 , at 334 
13 J. Rose, ‘Sexuality in the Field of Vision’ (Verso: London, 1986), at 80 




It is presumed that these attributes are the requirements needed to make a woman; 
and that all women share in this common identity14. This reinforces gender as a 
concept as being inextricably linked with cultural perceptions. If femininity is the 
result, there is necessarily a predetermined performance within the constraints of 
social expectations to achieve it. The female gender, and all the subsequent 
characteristics contained therein, is over-sexualised to the point of absurdity, with all 
focus remaining stubbornly upon the sexed body. It has been said that a woman’s 
breasts is the most prominent sign of her femininity15. 
Simone de Beauvoir16 posits that womanhood is the ‘Other’ against which man is 
defined17. This evidences the gender binary and suggests that women are 
subservient. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir considers how women in a patriarchal 
society are paternalistically assigned their place by the dominant males. In an 
analogy of poles, females are the negative to the male positive18. Butler 
commentates of de Beavouir’s contribution to feminist theory as critical in that she 
explained, “to be a woman within the terms of a masculinist culture is to be a source 
of mystery and unknowability for men”19. With males being the absolute determiners 
of the female role within society, it is unsurprising that the actual and the expected 
performance of femininity are so incongruous. 
Aristotle advanced that the, “female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of 
qualities… we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural 
 
14 N.4, at 3 
15 I.M. Young, ‘Breasted experience: The look and the feeling’ in The politics of women’s bodies: Sexuality, 
appearance and behaviour, ed. R. Weitz, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998), at 125-36 
16 S. de Beauvoir, ‘The Second Sex’, (Vintage: London, 2010) 
17 Ibid, in Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 1, at 21 & 45, and Volume II, Part 1, Chapter 1, at 293 
18 N. 10, at 3 
19 N.3, in Preface, at vii 




defectiveness”20. This suggests that women are not autonomous, concrete beings in 
their own right, but can only be defined in deference to males. Men do not have to 
define themselves; their existence is undisputed, but for women it is necessary to 
say, ‘I am woman’.  
 
De Beauvoir also suggests that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”21. 
This refers to the process known as gendering or, as Butler coined it, ‘girling’22; 
whereby children are born a blank slate without any innately feminine qualities, and 
subsequently learn their gender-appropriate behaviour. This process can be 
achieved through gendered play, which I shall later discuss. For now, the main 
stance is clear – gender is not something that a person is but how they act. 
 
Performativity of gender 
Butler explains gender performativity not as a pre-exiting identity waiting to be 
acknowledged, but rather that it is “performatively constituted by the very "expressions" 
that are said to be its results”23. Butler is suggesting here that gender is something we 
do rather than something we are, and so femininity is an ongoing process as a set of 
performances which constantly reinforce the message ‘I am woman’. In Gender 
Trouble, such performances are defined not as “…a singular act, but a repetition and 
a ritual”24. 
 
20 N. 8, at 4 
21 N. 16, at 293 
22 J. Butler, ‘Bodies That Matter’, (Routledge: New York, 1993), at 177 
23 N. 3, at 25  
24 Ibid, at 7 




Here, Butler postulates that gender is defined by the repetition of constrained norms, 
which forming the base of your identity, rather than some intangible idea. Following 
Butler’s hypothesis that gender is fluid and interchangeable, any minor alteration to 
the set of actions being repetitively performed could, in theory, change your gender 
as often as desired. Other commentators support her claims that gender is something 
open for customisation, “for any length of time, at any rate of change”25. Although 
theoretically this is logical, it is not practical because what constitutes ‘expressions of 
gender’ is left undefined by Butler. There is ambiguity as to whether it involves prima 
facie details such as dress and appearance, or more objectively-measurable criteria 
such as hormone levels or surgical reconstruction. It is unrealistic to suggest that 
your gender is fluid enough to change completely in a short period of time, and for 
that process to be infinitely repeatable.  
 
It is further unrealistic by the very act of performing gender remaining inadequately 
defined. In practice, the realm of gender is too ambiguous for a person to declare 
with sufficient certainty that from x point they are y gender. This struggle to separate 
acquired gender from preferable gender is particularly tense for transsexual and 




The Gender Dysphoric and their struggles with the gender binary 
 
 
25 K. Bornstein, ‘Gender outlaw: On women, men, and the rest of us’. (Routledge: New York, 1994), at 51-2 




Gender dysphoria exists as a mental disorder26 and is “characterized by a strong 
desired to be treated as the ‘other’ gender or to want to change one’s sex 
characteristics, and… feelings that are typical of the ‘other’ gender”27. It is important 
to note that “their gender is not disordered… indeed their gender is quite ordered, 
just not in conventional ways”28. Gender dysphoria tends to affect children and 
adolescents29, particularly following the onset of puberty. 
 
It is difficult to justify gender dysphoria’s existence as a mental disorder, when 
homosexuality was also pathologized within the DSM until 1973. I bring 
homosexuality into my discussion because it, as a diagnosis, was based on 
heteronormative assumptions of what was considered ‘normal’, ‘natural’ and ‘healthy’ 
at the time30. Ideas of gender and sexuality are not universal. Gender exists not 
within a vacuum but a constantly evolving society, where meaning is dependent on 
the material cultural context. 
For people with divergent genders, particularly the gender dysphoric, the 
heteronormative binary system and its conflation of sex and gender can feel 






26 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association (APA) 2013) 
27 A.I. Lev, ‘Gender Dysphoria: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’, (2013), Clinic Social Work Forum, 288, at 
292 
28 Ibid, at 290 
29 Ibid  
30 N.1, at 528 
31 P.L. Doan, ‘The tyranny of gendered spaces – reflections from beyond the gender dichotomy’ (2010) 17 
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The most authoritative piece of legislation regarding gender is the Gender 
Recognition Act (GRA) 2004, whose purpose is to allow gender dysphoric and 
transsexual people the right to legally identify as their acquired gender32. Such legal 
recognition is granted through a gender recognition certificate granted by the Gender 
Recognition Panel. To be considered, s.1 (1) of the GRA provides that applicants 
must be 18 years of age or over. However, this requirement excludes many people 
who the legislation aimed to benefit; those affected at puberty by gender dysphoria. 
S.1 (a) expects the applicant to already be ‘living in the other gender’. The statute is 
silent on what constitutes living as the opposite gender, and this subjectivity ensures 
a wide scope for the Gender Recognition Panel’s discretion. Conversely, it becomes 
difficult for applicants to know what is expected of them in order to fulfil the 
application criteria, and the law is most ineffective when it is uncertain. S.2 (1) curtails 
the Gender Recognition Panel’s discretion, for it is mandatory to approve an 
application if the individual in question has gender dysphoria33, has lived in the 
acquired gender for a minimum of 2 years34, and intends to do so until death35. The 
evidence required to prove such an intense commitment to the acquired gender is 
ambiguous, and is left unanswered by the GRA. 
 
It remains unclear how a person would ‘perform’ gender for a panel, but this in itself 
reflects how gendered identity is an ongoing process; never to be in stasis. It also, 
more gloomily, implies that it is not enough for you yourself to believe that you are the 
acquired gender; it is for others to judge that (at least for legal purposes). This 
 
32 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Explanatory Notes, at para. 3 
33 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s.2(1)(a) 
34 Ibid, s.2(1)(b) 
35 Ibid, s.2(1)(c)  




system provided by the GRA is arguably arbitrary in the way it processes applications 
for gender recognition certificates and such subjectivity is far from fair.  
 
To evidence your need for a gender recognition certificate, an expert in gender 
dysphoria provides an assessment36, furthering the idea that gender dysphoria is 
indeed a mental illness. The legislation itself references to more permanent, 
irreversible states of gender change, such as hormone treatment or surgery37. This 
mirrors society’s expectations for the gender dysphoric to take at least temporary 
steps towards the assimilation of the opposite gender38. This exposes how we as a 
society understand gender - it is the performance of our identity. The outward 
aesthetics of an applicant are given precedence over their emotions and mental 
state. Furthermore, it is absurd to pose criteria for applicants to meet when so little is 
understood about the condition itself. It is apparent that the law is confused regarding 
performativity of gender but a haphazard proviso will not aid clarification.  
 
The GRA further enforces the heteronormative gender binary because applicants are 
expected to identify as either male or female and so are restricted within two 
confines. The law reflects existing tensions between the traditional male/female 
binary and the people who challenge its legitimacy. Although the GRA appears to be 
embracing those who have “multiple and queer ways of expressing gender and 
sexuality”39, it operates in opposition to this by requiring applications subscribe to 
male or female. This denial of the threat transsexualism poses to the gender binary 
 
36 Ibid, s.3(1) 
37 Ibid, s.3(3) 
38 D. Valentine, ‘”The calculus of pain”: Violence, anthropological ethics, and the category transgender’, (2003), 
68 Ethnos 1, at 27-28 
39 N. 27, at 295 




indicates that the law is no more ready to formally acknowledge the existence of 
anything more than male and female40 than before this Act of Parliament; which 
Sandland refers to as, “a blunt, pragmatic and somewhat amoral response”41 to the 
case of Goodwin v UK42. As Butler points out, the medical approval given to 
transsexual individuals who are having to perform an essentialist construct of gender 
just further solidifies the concept of gender normativity43. Butler’s argument is 
convincing, and dismally forecasts a defeat for the embracement of further gender 
identities. As a result, transsexualism and gender dysphoria, rather than a crack in 
the armour for people to explore the unchartered gendered territory of ‘hybrid’, 
‘queer’, or ‘third’ genders; has become just another way of sectioning off society 






‘Girling’ the girl 
The origins of identification as ‘feminine’ has caused considerable controversy by 
commentators as to whether it is the influence of innate biological factors or, more 
persuasively, the process of ‘girling’ by parents and the child’s surrounding 
 
40 R. Sandland, ‘Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004’, (2005), 13 Feminist Legal Studies 3, at 43 
41 Ibid, at 46 
42 Christine Goodwin v UK [2002] GC (Application no. 28957/95) 
43 J. Butler, ‘Undoing gender’ (Routledge: New York, 2004), at 71 
44 L. Bondi, ‘Tenth anniversary address: For a feminist geography of ambivalence’, (2004), 11 Gender, Place and 
Culture 1, at 12 




environment at identity-sensitive stages. It has been posited from an anthropological 
perspective that the human personality is “malleable”45. This is evidenced by the 
observable difference in the personalities of children who are shown to be, “heavily 
influenced by the sex-specific child-rearing practices and by the nature and severity 
of sex-role differentiation imposed by that society”46. This suggests it is not biological 
determinants characterising the gendered attributes of a child, but the process of 
nurturing and education about gender-appropriate norms. Humans are identified at 
the point of birth, or even earlier, as either male or female and are expected to 
maintain this label for the duration of their life. This means the process of ‘girling’ a 
girl begins as soon as she arrives into the world, thus following the assumption that 
the proclamation of her biological sex is also indicative of her gender.  
Children are subject to a process of gendering through a variety of means; including 
socialization and toy play. Roles and attitudes of the people around them, particularly 
caregivers, engrain a sense of gendered identity within the children47 who, 
particularly by the age of two, are very much aware of their gender and the 
consequent expectations flowing from this. From this point on, they will often make 
their own choices about play and clothing to suit their gender. I use the word 
‘choices’ liberally, as it is accepted that children will be conforming to their 
understanding of what it means to perform gender within our society. They are also 
aware if other children do not fit in the gender categories they have devised; and are 
quick to identify and attempt correction of any deviant behaviour48. Deviant gender 
behaviour is more acceptable in girls than boys to both other children and parents. 
 
45 N.6, in Chapter 1, at 5 
46 Ibid 
47 E. Yearwood, ‘Children and Gender’ (2009) Contexts. Available at: http://ctx.sagepub.com/content/8/3/78. 
(Accessed: 05/03/2014) 
48 Ibid  




Androgyny in girls is rewarded with terms of endearment, such as ‘tomboy’, whereas 
equivalent classifications for boys carry more negative connotations; such as ‘sissy’. 
This reinforces the notion that for the child’s own benefit, binary gender norms for 
should be strict. If there is any divergence at all, only deviance favourable to 
masculinity is acceptable, which links back to the idea that femininity is subservient 
to masculinity and is the least desirable sex. 
Fine, in her book Delusions of Gender, discusses the transformative journey of 
children as gendered beings, and reasons that rather than children being born with 
some hard-wired knowledge about how to perform their gender49, it is the role of 
experience50 and how we treat baby boys and girls differently within hours of birth51 
that determines how they will identify. Fine posits that gender-neutral parenting is a 
difficult and rarely successful feat, but articulates that this is not a result of biology, 
but rather due to the unconscious gendered expectations of the parents transferring 
onto the child as it develops52. A girl will usually be presented with a lot of pink, her 
physical abilities will be under-estimated, and her propensity to care and nurture, for 
example through a love of stuffed animals, will be exaggerated and encouraged. 
This demonstrates how gender identity is not created in a vacuum but constructed 
due to the majority opinions by society about what is ‘normal’ at that material time.  
The toy industry perpetuates society’s desire to ‘girl’ the girl, and is effective because 
children use toys as gender category maintenance53. Children continually to favour 
 
49 C. Fine, ‘The Real Science Behind Sex Differences: Delusions of Gender’, (Icon Books: London, 2011), in 
Chapter 10, at 117 
50 Ibid, in Chapter 16, at 176 
51 N. 49, in Chapter 17, at 196 
52 N.49, in Chapter 18, at 199 
53 B. Davies, ‘Frogs and snails and feminist tails’, (Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1989) 




toys appropriate to their gender54. In a study on children and their favourite toys, it 
was shown girls preferred those which were marketed towards stereotypically 
‘feminine’ interests, such as caregiving, compared with the toys favourable to boys, 
characterised as action55. Toys with gendered interests propound the idea that 
children must recognise, from a very young age, what is appropriate to play with. 
This leads the child to characterize normal and abnormal gender performances 
based on the conclusions they make about their toys, which can have a great impact 
on the future development of their hobbies, careers and relationships. Branding 
aimed at girls places a lot of emphasis on the colour pink and appeals to the child’s 
ability to offer maternal nurturing. In particular, the toy doll ‘Baby Annabell’ is 
arguably the most gendered toy currently available on the market. The doll – white, 
blonde, female – carries a little sheep and offers ‘realistic’ features; such as crying, 
gurgling and giggling. Interaction between a child and this doll is an education in the 
needs of babies, and how to efficiently meet them. This provides a ‘learning by 
doing’ type experience56, where a child, not long since a baby herself, is already 
involved in the pedagogy of becoming a mother. Although this may appear an 
exaggeration; upper class American girls were “said to throw down their dolls that 
they may nurse their children”57; demonstrating the expectation that all girls, no 
matter how old, are considered mothers-to-be. The Zapf Creations website for Baby 
Annabell refers to the children as the “doll’s moms”58. This omission to reference the 
doll’s father indicates a gendered exclusivity of the toy. It goes without saying every 
 
54 I.D. Cherney et al, ‘The Effects of Stereotyped Toys and Gender on Play Assessment in Children Aged 18-47 
Months’, (2003) 23 Educational Psychology: An International Journal of Experimental Educational Psychology 1, 
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55 B. Francis, ‘Gender, toys and learning’, (2010) 36 Oxford Review of Education 3, at 329 
56 Ibid, at 333 
57 F. Marryat, ‘A Diary in America, with Remarks on its Institutions’, vol. II (New York, 1839), at 225 
58 Zapf Creations (2014) Baby Annabell. Available at: http://babyborn.medienlounge.com/index.php?id=9&L=0 
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baby requires male and female components to be created, but the lack of toys 
encouraging nurturing behaviours for male children presumes that caring for a child 
and possessing emotionally-intuitive qualities is something that girls, and girls alone, 
should do. Undoubtedly, the paternal role is just as important as the maternal one 
when raising a child (assuming the child is being raised in a heterosexual cisgender 
environment). These expectations become ingrained within children’s sense of 
gender categories, and the cycle is further perpetuated when they have children. It 
can be postulated that a girl, who will identify with her mother as a fellow female, can 
look to her for training and direction on becoming a mother herself59, and so the child 
may produce similar behaviours towards the toy doll that she may have received 
from her mother herself, and so the cycle perpetuates. Dolls being thrust upon 
female children strengthens de Beauvouir’s theory; one is not born innately maternal 
but a blank slate, and through the learning experience of mothering a doll and similar 
practices of gendered play, the process of ‘girling’ is complete; where the ultimate 
fulfilment of womanhood, as per society, is having a child. 
When feminine traits are performed inadequately, or wholly rejected, society seems 
to treat that woman with condemnation. This has particular emphasis where 
motherhood is declined by capable females because it is deemed the apex 
achievement of womanhood and the ultimate performance of femininity. It should be 
noted that in modern Western society, women are offered a lot more choice about 
their body and fertility due to medical advancements in contraception. However, it is 
seen as abnormal if you do not fulfil your ability to conceive. Women who are 
unfortunately infertile, their choice being removed, are met with sympathy and 
condolences. Women who choose not to, even if for educated reasons, are regarded 
 
59 N. Chodorow, ‘The Cycle Completed: Mothers and Children’, (2002) 12 Feminism & Psychology 1, at 12 




as deviant, and society does not receive such transgression from the appropriate 
female role comfortably. This is because “[c]ultural discourses of femininity and 
women’s social role have historically and traditionally been constructed around 
motherhood”60. Such deviancy from appropriate feminine discourse, in particular 
motherhood, could not be better demonstrated than through society’s treatment of 
women who kill. 
 
 
Women who kill 
I am going to briefly examine how women who kill are triply deviant (against the law, 
appropriate femininity, and the concept of motherhood), by using Rose West and 
Myra Hindley as case studies. I will evidence that the only ‘acceptable’ way to fulfil 
womanhood is to refrain from deviating from these socially-constructed gendered 
norms. Any deviance on the part of a woman is met with more emotive 
condemnation and scorn than a man committing the very same acts would receive. 
As a result, women are paternalised by the state as objects without agency. 
Conversely, the media and wider public criticise these women as evil and over-
sexualises them; even if aspects of sexuality are irrelevant to the case in question. 
Women who kill are seen to be deviating against feminine discourse by refusing to 
portray appropriate gender norms; ones I have spent the first part of this essay 
discussing. Because women who kill are seen as rejecting the very essence of 
femininity, they can only be characterised as one thing – masculine. Inchley argues 
 
60 R. Gillespie, ‘When No Means No: Disbelief, Disregard and Deviance as Discourses of Voluntary 
Childlessness’, (2000) 23 Women’s Studies International Forum 2, at 223 




this is done in contrast “against a stereotype of motherhood that is itself a symbolic 
manufacture suited to the perpetuation of patriarchal structures”61. To reiterate, 
femininity and its features have been constructed from a purely male perspective. 
Aggression and brutality are not considered attributes of appropriate femininity and 
so female criminals are labelled with masculine traits. Statistically-speaking, women 
commit considerably less violent crimes than men62. It appears convenient to much 
of society to reason that this is a result of women’s inherent passivity; thus 
perpetuating the sexist gender discourse that prescribes what is ‘normal’ for a 
woman63. Thus, these few women who oppose and challenge feminine discourse are 
viewed as deviant, and explanation is sought in the form of the women being mad, 
bad or a victim themselves64. Attempts to medicalise women who kill’s behaviour has 
become a common knee-jerk response, and has often led to conclusions of mental 
derangement or hormonal imbalances65. Jones comments; “[a]lmost naturally 
insane, a woman might easily be a natural criminal”66. These ‘explanations’ find their 
pretext within the nature of femininity, which is argued to be inherently embedded 
within these women, suggesting that being a woman itself is the problem; it’s an 
incurable disease. Weare submits that this reaction from the Criminal Justice System 
“further entrenches gender stereotypes surrounding women. That is to say that it 
enforces the idea that women are mad generally, but especially when they commit 
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murder”67. The biologically essential view she critiques is a dangerous one to take, 
where instead the cumulative effect of other factors such as environment, culture 
and sociology should be taken into account68 when considering female criminality; 
else there is a strong risk of missing the opportunity to understand women who kill.  
These violent women are thus labelled as triply-deviant. The first deviance is when a 
provision of the law is flagrantly violated through the commission of murder. The 
second instance of deviance from appropriate feminine discourse occurs when these 
women bypass the docile, pious and obedient expectations of them as constructed 
by society in becoming a criminal. This is not just a mere failure in appropriate 
gender performance, but a complete rejection of it. Finally, these women are further 
deviant by rejecting the institution of motherhood; bet it when they kill children or 
their absence of their own children – it is an institution deemed excessively important 
in the performance of appropriate and legitimate femininity. 
Many violent women appear in feminist discourses apart from Mrya Hindley, of which 
there is a “defeaning silence”69. Although commentators find it hard to analyse such 
behaviour because of its abhorrent quality, to remain silent in feminine discourse 
allows women such as Myra Hindley “the refuge of the myth of female passivity”70. 
This reinforces the idea that women are merely neutral spectators, incapable of 
having the drive or agency to intentionally commit such heinous acts when in fact, 
quite the opposite is true. It was established that while Ian Brady was the intiator, 
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Hindley was the commissioner of the killings71. Far from relying on her femininity to 
bring her solace, Myra Hindley refused to indulge in ‘victim appropriate’ behaviour in 
the courtroom. Although the show of remorse or even tears would have been 
beneficial to the outcome of her case72, Hindley did not submit to appropriate 
feminine discourse. Arguably, Hindley would have received more sympathy if she 
had subscribed to the expected notions of femininity, such as heightened emotion, 
for she would have been rendered harmless; she would have become a meek and 
unthreatening woman again; the perfect embodiment of the patriarchal oppression73. 
Upon doing this, female criminals find themselves the recipients of a chivalrous 
paternity on behalf of the state who are less willing to harshly punish. By refusing to 
do so, violent female offenders such as Hindley find themselves sentenced not just 
according to the legislative tarrif provided for their acts, but “according to the degree 
to which their behaviour… has deviated from the appropriate female behaviour”74. 
When traditional female gender roles have been violated, punishment tends to be 
harsher than a male committing an equivalent act. Hindley became extremely 
evocative to the public, strongly opposing her release, because of her triple 
deviance. Not only had she been an active participant in the depravity, thus adopting 
a more sexually-active and masculine persona; the crimes had involved children. 
Childless herself, this further offended the institution of nurturing motherhood, 
exacerbated by her competent mental capacity. Without the convenient label of 
‘mad’ to give her, it was with a sense of outrage that an innately sexist society 
received such flagrant violations of the female role in the commission of such violent 
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murders. A police photograph taken of her staring defiantly into the camera was 
circulated by the media and became “synonymous with the idea of feminine evil”75, 
because whilst aesthetically conforming to femininity, she is the “victim of a sick, 
clever male mind”76. 
Similarly, Rose West committed triple deviance against conventional feminine 
discourse and was tried alone for 10 counts of murder. Her partner, Fred West, had 
committed suicide before commencement of the trial. Despite her consistently 
denying any complicity, she was convicted and criminal input from Fred was 
minimised. In fact, it was her indignant protestations which caused the jury to 
speculate upon West’s contribution to the murders77. Throughout the trial, attention 
was brought to her ‘deviant’ sexuality, despite having little relevancy to the case in 
question. Incredibly intimate details, such as personal sexual preference, was openly 
discussed in court78. Acts of ‘lesbianism’ and references to ‘whorish’ behaviour 
suggest that the law is most comfortable when regulating female sexuality. Women 
who are sexually divergent are treated more severely than women who could be 
“more readily constructed within feminine discourse”79. With such biased 
preconceptions, it is unsurprising that society reduces gender “to sexual identity and 
agency is understood as an abstract structural potential or in narrowly libidinal 
terms”80. Far from being chaste, West was immediately disadvantaged by her 
sexuality in a discourse constructed by conflicting female roles. Contrast this with an 
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analogy where she is male; such discussion around his sexuality would be regarded 
as wholly irrelevant.  
Not only was West expected to be the nurturing and docile persona appropriate for 
her gender role, she was also subject to the motherhood mandate. Considered the 
apex fulfilment of womanhood, mothering is not just something that is to be done; it 
is something to be done well. West was a bad mother, with a debauched sense of 
morality, and by helping her husband to kill their own daughters she effectively tore 
down the discourse constructed around the ‘natural’ and ‘innate’ maternal love 
women have for their children. This distortion of appropriate gender discourse 
effectively undermines the institution of motherhood, and so West’s femininity was 
rejected. Instead, she becomes unnatural and ‘other’; so as to completely distinguish 
her from other ‘normal’ women who would not commit the same kinds of violent 
offence.  
Women who kill find their voices “stigmatised or silenced”81, thus leaving the public 
and media to fill in the blanks. To describe my case studies, terms such as ‘icon of 
evil’ were used by the media; whose stereotypes of female criminals are limited to 
variations of “witch, whore or bewildered mother”82. With violent offenders such as 
Hindley and West, their deviation from appropriate feminine norms and society’s 
gendered biases become just as important as the crimes committed. Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights promises defendants a right to a fair hearing 
and the UK courts prima facie granted this to both of my case studies. However, with 
such a massive absence of identity, the whisper of female criminal’s voices are 
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barely heard by half-closed minds. Our preconceptions of gender, firmly established 
in our minds since childhood, instruct us that such voices are to be regarded with 




Although the Butlerian conception of gender fluidity is attractive, it remains too 
abstract to offer any practical solutions, particularly not for the gender dysphoric and 
transsexuals from the strictly-oppressive gender categories in which society operates 
today. Although the GRA 2004 cosmetically goes some way to offer legal recognition 
to those wishing to change their gender, it remains stoic (when offering an either/or 
model of the polar-opposite genders for acquirement) in affirming the 
heteronormative gender binary, whose biologically essentialist view works as an 
exclusionist tool against those who refute its legitimacy by wishing to pursue third or 
other genders. This gender binary is culturally and socially constructed through 
discourse, where gender is not something derivative of your sex but something 
learned from a young and impressionable age. Parenting, pedagogy and play with 
gender-specific toys protect against any diversion from these strict ‘appropriate’ 
gender roles. In particular, girls from a young age are subject to an array of 
conflicting ideologies to which they must conform about what it means to be 
‘woman’; heterosexual, chaste, passive and maternal. Any deviation from this is 
condemned as abnormal and, especially in the case of women who kill, met with 
society’s rejection of the female’s self-identification as ‘feminine’.   
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